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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
DONALD H. MEYERS , and ENGIN-
EERING ENTERPRISES, INC., 
d/b/ a INTERMOUNTAIN AERIAL 
SURVEYS, 
Plaintiffs-Respondents, 
-vs. -
INTERWEST CORPORATION, a 
Utah corporation; SKYCHOPPERS 
OF UTAH, a Utah corporation; 
and SKYCHOPPERS OF COLORADO, 
a Colorado corporation, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
Uo. 17070 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
SKYCHOPPERS OF COLORADO 
INTRODUCTORY STATEMENT 
Defendant/Appellant Skychoppers of Colorado feels compelled 
to file this Reply Brief because of various misstatements, irreg-
ularities and improprieties incorporated in plaintiffs' responsive 
brief. 
ARGUMENT 
I. Re Respondents' Statement of Facts. On page 2, plaintiffs 
state that "Several negotiations were undertaken between the parties 
and Complaints were finally filed on August 7, 1978." Plaintiffs 
make no citation to the record to support the statement that "several 
negotiations were undertaken between the parties", and, in fact, 
--
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an examination of the record on appeal will reveal no affidavit, 
exhibit or testimony of any kind which would place this alleged 
fact in the record. Making such a statement that settlement 
negotiations were ever undertaken is a flagrant attempt to create 
a factual issue on appeal where no such fact was ever introduced 
before the trial court. Defendant trusts that the impropriety 
of such a practice is so obvious and well understood that citatic'. 
of authority regarding the same is not necessary. 
II. Re Respondents' Argument to Amend Summons (under 
Point I). The simple answer to plaintiffs' argument of this pok 
is that this Court has heretofore stated what errors in process 
are mere irregularities", e.g., failing to name a guardian ad 
litem, Ballard v. Buist, 8 Utah 2d. 308, 333 P.2d 1071 (1959) 
and those which are "jurisdictional", e.g. , improper designation 
of statutory period for making appearance, Martin v. Nelson, 533 
P.2d 897 (Utah 1975) or failing to endorse the date of service 
on the copy of the summons served, Reese v. Scott, 8 Utah 2d. 13'. 
329 P.2d 877 (1958). Plaintiffs' argument in effect is suggestin: 
that this Court now change the rule it has heretofore establishec 
by making a defect which has previously been held to be juris-
dictional to now be only a mere irregularity. Such a vacillatior 
of law would not be in the best interests of maintaining a 
reasonably consistent and predictable jurisprudence in the State 
of Utah. 
-2-
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.0'. 
:n: 
III. Re Respondents' Abuse of Discretion Argument (under 
Point I). Plaintiffs argue that a trial court ruling on a dis-
cretionary matter should not be reversed unless it is found to 
be clearly arbitrary. Such is admittedly the rule with respect 
to a trial court's ruling on a matter in which it is to decide 
what is "just and proper under the circumstances", sometimes 
referred to as "judicial discretion." Whereas, "abuse of disc re-
tion" means that such discretion has not been lawfully exercised. 
See State ex rel Nielsen v. Superior Court for Thurston County, 
110 P.2d 645 (Wash. 1941); Nix v. State, 213 So.2d 554 (Miss. 
1968). 
A trial court has no discretion to alter statutory provi-
sions, court rules or prior pronouncements of this Court regarding 
jurisdictional requirements. When a trial court makes such an 
error in law, it is also referred to as an "abuse of discretion," 
but since it involves an error in law rather than an equitable 
14 evaluation of facts and circumstances, the court has no discretion. 
.or. 
:e 
In Medina v. The District Court for the County of Otero, 
493 P. 2d 367 (Colo. 1972), the Court in discussing "abuse of 
discretion" observed: 
"The latter phrase has been given such 
varied interpretations we deem it 
necessary to clarify our view of the 
lower court's action and we follow the 
persuasive rationale in Eager v. 
Derowitsch, 78 Wyo. 251, 232 P.2d 713 
(1951) dealing with the expressing 
'abuse of discretion'. The Wyoming 
-3-
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noted: 
Court said, quoting from Barrett v. 
Board River Power Co., 146 S.C. 85, 
143 S.E. 650, as follows: 
'We are sure that in many 
instances, in the years gone 
by, the rulings of presiding 
judges, in matters where they 
are given a right to exercise 
their discretion, were not 
interferred with because of 
the old unfortunate statement 
to the effect that it must be 
shown that there was an 'abuse 
of discretion.' Recently it 
has been shown time after time 
that the term 'abuse of dis-
cretion' does not mean any 
reflection upon the presiding 
judge, and it is a strict legal 
term, to indicate that the 
appellate court is simply of 
the opinion that there was 
commission of an error of law 
in the circumstances. 
(Emphasis added.) 
In Brown v. Beck, 169 P.2d 855 (Ariz. 1946), the Court 
"The word 'abuse of discretion' as used 
in many cases in reference to the action 
of the trial court is defined as, in the 
case of Detroit Fidelity & Surety Co. v. 
Foster, 170 S.C. 121, 169 S.E. 871, 'The 
term 'abuse of discretion' does not mean 
any reflection on the presiding judge 
and does not carry with it an implication 
of conduct deserving censure, but is 
strictly a legal term indicating that 
the appellate court is of the opinion 
that under the circumstances the trial 
judge committed error of law in the 
exercise of his discretion.' 1 Words 
and Phrases, Perm. Ed., 182." 
And, as stated in Beck v. Wingsfield, Inc., 122 F.2d 114 (3rd 
Cir. 1941), 
-4-
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" ... action that would be necessary in 
ordinary affairs to make one guilty of 
an abuse connotes conduct of a different 
grade than what is meant when a court is 
said to have abused its discretion. Abuse 
of discretion in law means that the 
court's action was in error as a matter of 
law. And where such abuse exists, reversal 
will be ordered. See Cervin v. W. T. Grant 
Co. , 5 Cir. , 100 F. 2d 153, 155, 156." 
To the same effect, see Macauley v. Query, 7 S.E.2d 519 (S.C. 1940); 
Wood v. Waggoner, 293 N.W. 188 (S.D. 1940); Detroit Fidelity & 
Surety Co. v. Foster, 169 S.E. 871 (S.C. 1933); Paine v. Cohen, 
167 S.E. 665 (S.C. 1933); and Tunstal v. Learner Shops, 159 S.E. 
386 (S. C. 1931). 
This Court also acknowledged in State v. Draper, 27 P.2d 
39, 50 (Utah 1933), that abuse of discretion includes the corrnnission 
of an error of law by the trial court in stating: 
"It does not imply intentional wrong or 
bad faith or misconduct, nor any reflec-
tion on the judge. Root v. Bingham, 26 
S.D. 118, 128 N.W. 132; State v. Dist. 
Court, 213 Iowa, 822, 238 N.W. 290, 80 
A.L.R. 339. It is a legal term to 
indicate that the appellate court is 
of the opinion that there was commission 
of error of law in the circumstances. 
Bishop v. Bishop, 164 S.C. 493, 162 S.E. 
756. It is an improvident exercise of 
discretion; an error of law. Quinn v. 
Gardiner (C.C.A.) 32 F. (2d) 772; Bring-
hurst v. Harkins, 2 W.W. Harr. (Del.) 
324, 122 A. 783. A discretion exercise 
to an end and purpose not justified by 
and clearly against reason and evidence. 
1 C.J. 372." 
-5-
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In the case at bar, the trial court failed to follow the 
statutory edict.!./ and prior pronouncements of this Court. '?:_I The 
failure to designate the proper statutory period for making an 
appearance in a summons served upon a nonresident defendant has 
been held by this Court to constitute a jurisdictional defect. 
The trial court committed an error of law on a point of law in 
which it had no discretion, and, therefore, it must be reversed. 
IV. Re Respondents' Argument that Process Served was 
Merely Irregular and not Void (under Point II). Under this point 
respondents merely note as stated in 62 Am.Jur.2d, Process §14 
that some jurisdictions hold that a defect in the stated time 
for return in a summons is fatal, while others hold that it is 
an irregularity which may be amended. Respondents then cite 
some cases from jurisdictions permitting amendment. Such argumen: 
ignores the fact that Utah is aligned with those states holding 
such a defect to be jurisdictional, particularly where the effect 
of the defect is to shorten a statutorily provided period, as 
noted in respondents' quote from 62 Am.Jur.2d, Process §14, supra 
"It seems generally agreed that a Summons 
which is returnable in fewer than the 
number of days provided by statute will 
be quashed on Motion." (Emphasis added.) 
Respondents cite no reasons why Utah should now change its 
recent (1975) pronouncement'?:../ that a summons was defective for~ 
11section 78-27-27, U.C.A., 1953, as amended. 
~/Martin v. Nelson, 533 P.2d 897 (Utah 1975). 
-F.-
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reasons, the second being "and because the sunrrnons served on the 
California defendant required answering within 20 rather than 30 
days." Appellant submits that in the absence of some compelling 
reason to change a well-recognized and recently announced principle 
of law, the same should not be changed. 
V. Re Respondents' Waiver Argument (under Point II). 
Respondents on page 10 of their brief make the statement that: 
"This case, however, is a case which involves 
a defendant who has participated in settle-
ment negotiations for a period of time in 
excess of 20 months, ... This additionally 
involves a case in which the defendant has now 
chosen to appear only after 20 months to quash 
the service originally considered by all parties 
to be valid." 
This is a flagrant and, in appellant's judgment, a censurable mis-
statement of the record. There is no evidence in the record that 
this defendant ever, ~fortiori over a 20 month period, participated 
in any settlement negotiations. 
Respondents also on page 10 of their brief infer that 
appellant (defendant Skychoppers of Colorado) is at fault in this 
matter by 
.. inducing an adverse party's inaction 
to their detriment. If plaintiffs had not 
been induced into inaction on the complaint, 
" 
Again, there is not a single document or other item of evidence 
introduced before the trial court to support the contention that 
the appellant did anything to induce the respondents into inaction. 
Such a statement is a bald-faced misrepresentation of the record 
in this matter. 
Respondents did not even allege, vis-a-vis introduce evidence, 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
before the trial court that appellant induced respondents into 
inaction in this matter. The relevant allegations on this 
point are contained in paragraphs 2 and 3 of respondents' /plainti 
Motion for Leave to Amend Process (R. 16) which allege: 
"2. Service of process was made on August 
15, 1978; and plaintiffs since that time 
have extended to defendants through its 
insurer time within which to answer in 
that no answer would be required so long 
as negotiations for settlement were pending. 
3. Plaintiffs have to this point in time 
never demanded that their Complaint be 
answered, nor have they ever asserted a 
right to nor attempted to have a default 
entered against any of the defendants in 
this action." 
It is clear from the record that respondents have never 
claimed that appellant, Skychoppers of Colorado, has done anythin: 
to induce respondents to do, or not to do anything in this case. 
As a matter of fact, respondents/plaintiffs never made a 
settlement offer in this matter, either before or after the 
complaint was filed. Respondents pointed out on page 12 of its 
brief that it is impossible to cite a negative fact in the 
record, but challenged plaintiffs to acknowledge that the record 
was devoid of any offer of settlement having been made either 
during the four-year period between the time of the accident and 
when suit was cotmnenced, or during the 20-month period after the 
suit was filed until appellant moved to quash the summons. As 
noted above, respondents make the irresponsible statement under 
their STATEMENT OF FACTS that "Several negotiations were undertai 
between the parties. . . ", but failed to cite any evidence in th< 
-8-
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record to support such a statement. Appellant contends that there 
is no such evidence in the record and if such fact had existed, 
certainly such evidence would have been introduced by plaintiffs/ 
respondents before the trial court by way of documents or affidavit 
of someone having such knowledge. 
As noted above, before the trial court the plaintiffs 
alleged only that they had indicated to defendant that no answer 
would be required so long as negotiations for settlement were 
pending. Plaintiffs did not allege that settlement negotiations 
had ever cornr:ienced. As the record shows, the plaintiffs did not 
file their complaint until the day before the statute of limita-
tions ran on the cause of action alleged and then ignored their 
lawsuit. This defendant likewise ignored the lawsuit until it 
made the motion to quash which is the subject of this appeal. 
Plaintiffs now claim that they were misled by the defendant, who 
did only that which the plaintiffs did, to-wit: ignore plaintiffs' 
lawsuit for 20 months. 
After making the erroneous and unsupported statements that 
defendant induced plaintiffs into inaction, plaintiffs state on 
page 11 of their brief that: 
"However, a closer investigation indicates 
that the defendant's failure to make a 
timely Motion has caused the waiver of its 
rights to claim that the irregularities 
render the service of process void." 
-9-
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There is no evidence in the record that defendant ever 
did anything from which it could be inferred that it waived 
its right to challenge any service made upon it. It is horn-
book law that a person alleging waiver must show an intentional, 
voluntary relinquishment of a known right by the party against 
whom the waiver is alleged. As stated in 28 Am.Jur.2d, Estoppel 
and Waiver §154, p.836: 
"A waiver, according to the generally 
accepted definition, is the voluntary 
and intentional relinquishment of a 
known right, claim or privilege. It 
has also been defined as the intentional 
surrender of a known right or privilege, 
such surrender modifying other existing 
rights or privileges, or varying the 
terms of a contract. Waiver is a 
voluntary act and implies election by 
a person to dispense with something of 
value or to forego some right or advan-
tage which he might at his option have 
demanded and insisted upon. * ·k '>'<" 
Since plaintiffs admit they never demanded a response 
to the service of process made upon this defendant, no duty to 
act thereon arose, and since the record discloses no act or 
omission which would indicate an intentional, voluntary relin-
quishment of the right to challenge any process served upon it, 
this defendant cannot now be held to have waived the right to 
challenge the sufficiency of the process served upon it. 
Also, with respect to plaintiffs' contention that defenda: 
motion was not timely filed, it should be noted "timeliness" is 
-10-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
a concept which must interact with duty to act, or in fact action 
which has been taken that may create an estoppel. Plaintiffs 
cite Miller v. Ziegler, 3 Utah 17, 5 Pac. 518 (1881) on the 
timeliness issue. However, the case is clearly not applicable 
to the fact situation of the case at bar since in Miller the 
defendant sat quietly by while a judgment was taken against him 
and then sought reversal on appeal. The Court noted that the 
defendant could not "sit quietly by and seek judgment against 
him by default. ." (emphasis added). In the case at bar, 
the defendant has sought nothing from the plaintiffs and the 
plaintiffs have done nothing and, therefore, there is no conduct 
on the part of the defendant of which they can complain. 
Likewise, Thomas v. District Court of Third Judicial 
District in and for Salt Lake County, 171 P.2d 667 (Utah 1946) 
cited by plaintiffs is not helpful in resolving the issues of 
the case at bar. In fact, the case strongly supports defendant's 
position that a sumrnons which incorrectly designates the time in 
which to appear is defective. In Thomas, supra, at 668, it is 
stated: 
"It would seem that such defects in the 
return of service, which could properly 
have been amended had application therefor 
been made, are not as vital as is the 
endorsement of time of service upon the 
summons, because the endorsement of the 
date of service is in effect a part of 
the summons as fixing the time in which 
defendant must appear. Dolan v. Jones, 
37 Wash. 176, 79 P. 640. Williams v. 
Pittock, 35 Wash. 271, 77 P. 385." 
(Emphasis added.) 
_,, -
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The fixing of time in which to appear is affected by two 
elements, the date of service which must be endorsed upon the 
sUl!llllons and the period of time stated within the summons when 
an appearancemustbe made. If there is an error or omission 
in either element, the summons is then defective because it does 
not correctly advise the defendant of the time in which he must 
appear. 
Also, from a full reading of Thomas, supra, it is clear 
that the "timeliness" requirement referred to is that the motion 
and special appearance to attack jurisdiction must be made befor, 
the defendant appears generally and defends on the merits. The 
Court quoted with approval at page 669 its prior decision in 
Glassmann v. District Court, 80 Utah 1, 12 P.2d 361 (1932), wher 
it held: 
"We have no hesitation in saying that the 
court erred in overruling the motion to 
dismiss the writ. If the defendant had 
appeared and pleaded without first inter-
posing the motion, the case would be 
entirely different but such was not the 
fact, and his motion was well taken." 
The requirement that a timely motion to quash must be made spec! 
before appearing generally was again stated by the Utah Court u 
the recent case of Martin v. Nelson, 533 P.2d 897 (Utah 1975) ~ 
the Court observed: 
-12-
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"Service of process here was defective, not 
only because of the false return, but because 
it required answer in 20 days instead of 30 
days. Such service is jurisdictional. 
Defendant, as was his right, apReared 
specially and raised the point. 
(Emphasis added.) 
In the instant case, defendant's motion to quash was timely 
not only in the sense that a special appearance for that purpose 
was made before defendant filed a general answer and defended on 
the merits, but defendant responded to the service made upon it 
before it was ever required to do so. As plaintiffs admit, at 
the time of service they indicated no response would be required 
at that time and have never since required a response. It is 
difficult to understand how plaintiffs can contend defendant's 
motion was not timely when plaintiffs, by their own conduct, gave 
an open extension of time in which to respond and never up to the 
time that the motion was filed, demanded a response. It was the 
plaintiffs, not the defendant, who by their voluntary, intentional 
acts, waived the right to demand a "more timely" response to 
their service of process than that which they in fact received. 
VI. Re Respondents' Argument that Appellant was not 
Misled or Disadvantaged by the Trial Court's Denial of its 
Motion to Quash. Again, under this point, respondents engage 
in the flagrant practice of stating facts not found in the 
record. They state, at page 14: 
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"All parties consider the process to be 
proper and sufficient and had through 
mutual agreement, contemplating settlement, 
not required the defendant Skychoppers of 
Colorado to answer or otherwise plead." 
There is absolutely nothing in the record to support the contenti 
that defendant ever considered the process to be proper. Defe~ 
was told it need not respond to the process and it did not. Notr.: 
more is shown, or can be inferred from the record. 
Since the complaint was filed the last day before the 
statute of limitations ran, another complaint could not have beer. 
filed or served on the defendant, and since a summons must issue 
for service within three months from date the complaint is filed. 
a proper summons could not have been issued after the 9lst day 
after the complaint was filed. The trial court by now, more than 
20 months after the summons was served, permitting the summons 
so served to be amended has, in effect, extended the statute of 
limitations against the defendant in this action by the 20 month 
period in question. 
As stated in appellant's brief, "it is difficult to concei· 
of a more prejudicial situation than having a statute of limita· 
tion period extended after it has run." Respondents surely must 
jest when they state in their brief, p. 14: 
"The question left begging in these cir-
cumstances is just exactly how the defendant 
Skychoppers of Colorado was disadvantaged 
in these circumstances where no action 
toward default was every taken." 
-14-
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Finally, respondents contend that appellant has not shown 
that it was in some way misled by the defective service. Such 
contention is immaterial. This Court in the 1946 case of Thomas 
v. District Court of Third Judicial District in and for Salt Lake 
County, supra, observed that the trial court there, apparently as 
the trial court in the case at bar, takes the position that the 
plaintiff must allege and show that he was misled by the defect. 
This Court, in answer to such contention, stated: 
" ... Such is not the provision of the statute. 
And we find no well reasoned, adjudicated case, 
holding that where service is attacked by 
motion before pleading or judgment, a trial 
court can inquire into the question of being 
misled. That would be strictly judicial 
legislation. In L.R.A. 1917C, 148. That 
case lays down the rule: 'It is the general 
rule, that, if a statute prescribes a method 
for serving process, the method must be 
followed.' 
" . The burden of the annotation is 
that the theory of some cases holding 
that the defendant must show he has been 
misled is unsound and is summarized in 
this statement: 'It is sufficient to say 
of them that they are utterly contrary 
to the modern American notions of the 
power and purposes of a court of justice 
... Indeed, apart from purely clerical 
errors or blemishes or defects in im-
material matters, the courts have no 
right to enter into the question of 
whether or not in their opinion the party 
was misled.' The annotation is commended 
to the reader." 
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And, again in 1958, this Court in Rees v. Scott, 8 Utah 2d. 134, 
329 P. 2d 877, quashed a service of summons where the sunmions was 
not properly endorsed by the serving officer, and in so doing, 
stated: 
"We see no merit in the contention that 
the defendant has the burden to allege 
and prove that he was misled by the 
defect. The trial court properly 
granted the motion to quash." 
CONCLUSION 
The arguments raised in the BRIEF OF PLAINTIFFS-RESPONDEilT: 
are fallacious and specious, being based on allegations of fact 
not supported by the record and on legal authorities which are 
contrary to specific holdings of this Court. 
As discussed under the points of the BRIEF OF APPELLk~T. 
the trial court, in excess of its jurisdiction, has attempted to 
extradict the plaintiffs from the painful position in which they 
now find themselves, but for which they alone are responsible. 
While such an effort may seem commendable, it cannot be condoned 
when it abridges the rights of the defendant to challenge the 
sufficiency of the process served upon him. 
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WHEREFORE, the defendant Skychoppers of Colorado respectfully 
prays that the orders of the trial court be reversed and that the 
summons which was served upon this defendant be quashed and 
deemed null and void. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this __ day of January, 1981. 
DAVID K. WATKISS 
H. WAYNE WADSWORTH 
of and for 
WATKISS & CAMPBELL 
310 South Main, 12th Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: 801/363-3300 
FRED C. BEGY, III 
of and for 
LORD, BISSELL & BROOK 
115 South LaSalle Street 
Chicago, Illinois 60603 
Telephone: 312/443-0371 
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellant 
Skychoppers of Colorado 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I mailed, postage prepaid, two (2) 
true and correct copies of the foregoing REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLA.~T 
SKYCHOPPERS OF COLORADO to Robert W. Brandt, Esq., RICHARDS, BRANDT, 
MILLER & NELSON, 48 Post Office Place, P. O. Box 2465, Salt Lake 
City, Utah 84110, this __ day of January, 1981. 
Of Defendant's Counsel 
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